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‘I have read the reports in your newspaper of the recent !ooding’, wrote Geo" 
L. Harrison, Executive Engineer of the River Murray Commission (RMC), to 
the Border Morning Mail in 1958 (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). ‘[A]nd’, he continued, 
‘because of reported inaccurate statements regarding this !ood and some 
misconceptions regarding !oods generally, I feel that the following facts should 
be placed on record’. Harrison was responding to claims by farmers that the 
Hume Dam, operated by the Commission, had caused recent !oods on the Murray 
River. He denied that water releases had exacerbated !oods for those below the 
dam: ‘statements that the gates were raised, allowing large volumes of water to 
escape, or that it was a “man-made” !ood, are inaccurate as no stored water was 
released’. He argued that !oods had occurred ‘from time immemorial’, and that 
when river !ow was ‘too large to be contained in the channel it spreads over 
its own !oodplain’. He criticised negative press reports that ‘abuse the river (or 
some convenient authority) for the destruction it has wrought’ (‘Flood Control’ 
pt. 2). Harrison’s position was that !oods were ‘natural’ occurrences, dams and 
o#cials should not be blamed; but they were. 
Harrison’s strong defence of dams highlights signi$cant changes in people’s 
understandings about the river in !ood with and without dams. The Murray 
River, like many rivers in Australia, has !ooded (and dried up) intermittently 
since well before European settlement. The evolution of complex !oodplain 
ecologies along the river attests to this. In the period since colonisation, those 
living along the river had experienced a number of large !oods, for example in 
1870, 1917 and 1927. However, the building of large dams and other regulatory 
structures brought changes to both the environment and understandings of 
!oods and the river. What does it mean that !oods could be seen as ‘man-made’? 
What does this tell us about changing understandings of the Murray at a time 
when its !ows were rapidly being regulated through large dams and other 
structures? 
1 This paper uses the measurements, monetary values and currency quoted in primary sources, except 
where conversions to contemporary units and values have been necessary for comparison or clarity.
Blaming the government for !oods was a cultural and political shift induced 
by the timing and size of the 1956 !oods, which occurred two years before 
Harrison wrote his letter. These !oods remain the only time the Murray and 
Darling river systems have !ooded together since European colonisation. The 
event occurred after four decades of transforming the Murray into a regulated 
river, a period of world history in which dams became powerful symbols of the 
transformative power of engineering and technology. Yet it appeared engineering 
had not delivered the promised environmental security. It seemed to some that 
dams, built to minimise the e"ects of drought, were paradoxically bringing 
!oods. More, albeit smaller, !oods in 1958 increased farmers’ concerns over 
the operation of dams and indeed the very presence of these large regulatory 
structures in the upper Murray and its tributaries. 
The Murray is one of the longest rivers in Australia, second only to the Darling, 
which is one of its tributaries.2 Together, these river systems form what is now 
known as the Murray-Darling Basin, which covers approximately one seventh 
of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Water’). The Murray’s headwaters 
are in the Great Dividing Range, a mountain range that runs along the east coast 
of Australia. The river is fed by many tributaries that are $lled by snowmelt 
from these ranges as well as rainfall. The Murray forms most of the length of the 
state boundary between New South Wales and Victoria, and also runs through 
South Australia before emptying into the Indian Ocean. The river is highly 
signi$cant; it forms the cornerstone of Australia’s agricultural industry, is an 
important site of biodiversity, and is deeply embedded in both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous cultures (Weir 26-46; Sinclair 3-25). In the midst of Australia’s 
current period of growing water uncertainty, especially along the Murray, it 
is important that we revisit pivotal moments such as the 1956 and 1958 !oods 
and the building of large dams which have shaped the physical and cultural 
landscape in such an enduring way. 
This paper focuses on the 1956 and 1958 !oods in the Murray as turning points 
in understandings of !oods, the river and dams. Analysis centres on a set of 
newspaper clippings, as well as other documents, from two archives held by 
the National Archives of Australia. These archives are two halves of a bigger 
$le, titled ‘Flood Control – investigation of !ood control and mitigation in the 
Murray Valley’ (‘Flood Control’ pt. 1 and pt. 2). The records are from the o#ce 
of the Commonwealth Minister for National Development, William Henry 
Spooner, and focus in large part on responses by the federal government to the 
1956 and, to a lesser extent, 1958 !oods. This department, which was created 
in 1950 and dissolved in 1972, was at the forefront of river regulation and the 
2 The Darling River system, however, has a very di"erent hydrology from the Murray River system and 
they are somewhat independent. The Darling River system is a"ected by northern monsoonal rains, whereas 
the !ow in the Murray is largely dependent on winter rainfall and spring snowmelt (see Pittock et al.).
‘planning and co-ordination’ of other projects towards ‘the development of 
natural resources on a national basis’ (Department of National Development). It 
oversaw federal interests in the construction of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Scheme. In addition, Spooner headed the state/federal conglomeration 
that was the RMC, the precursor to the Murray-Darling Basin Initiative and 
the then facilitator of cost-shared engineering works as well as river research 
(Department of National Development; Merritt 62).
The newspaper clippings I have selected from this $le centre on the increasing 
concerns of farmers about the e"ects of the Snowy Mountains Scheme and the 
Hume Dam on !oods. In particular, I concentrate on newspaper articles from 
the Border Morning Mail, published in the town of Albury, then the centre of 
a dairy region and located along the upper Murray River in New South Wales, 
just below the Hume Dam. This region also encompasses the town of Wodonga, 
on the opposite bank of the Murray in Victoria. Through these articles we can 
glimpse bigger transitions in the way rivers and !oods were understood after 
the construction of dams and some of the signi$cance of these years of rapid 
change.
I focus on three issues that bring together and explore experiences of 
environmental, cultural, and technological transformation. First, I examine what 
greater government involvement in river !ow and centralised control through 
large-scale dams has meant for changes in environmental understandings, 
particularly understandings of !oods as ‘natural’ events. Second, there is an 
undercurrent of anxiety in newspaper editorials by farmers that dams had, 
and would continue to, change the way !oods !owed across farming land, 
including their size and frequency. Following the 1956 and 1958 !oods people 
were concerned that the dams could alter !ood !ow so drastically that previous 
knowledge and experience did not prepare them for these radically di"erent 
!ows. Dams became sources of uncertainty about future environmental, and 
related economic, change.
Last, I explore anxieties and disputes around dams and the !oods within 
a political context. Non-irrigators expressed a sense of injustice towards 
government policies and river regulation that favoured the interests and 
expansion of the irrigation industries and small-scale farming, such as fruit, 
vegetable, and nut farming, small-scale dairies, and viticulture. Largely non-
irrigating primary producers, like cattle and sheep graziers and some dairy 
farmers, were increasingly being sidelined in government policies and projects.3 
3 There was both irrigated and non-irrigated dairy farming. Small-scale irrigated diary farming was being 
encouraged at this time (and later) by state programs of closer settlement (see footnote 6). Dairy farmers 
increasingly employed irrigation techniques. For example, between 1979 and 1982, 79.4 percent of the total 
area under irrigation in Victoria was used for pasture (Powell, Watering 255).
They questioned technocratic projects of national development and the bias of 
governments at a time of widespread support for the regulation of the Murray 
for irrigation water supply. 
The 1956 and 1958 !oods and their fallouts must be seen within the wider 
context of inter-war and post-war development (1930s to 1960s) and the 1950s 
as a decade of change in Australia. As Nicholas Brown has argued in Governing 
Prosperity, ‘the 1950s bear a particular weight as a point of separation between 
an old and a new Australia’; from ‘an Australia of class, hardship, Empire and 
assertive nationalism’ to ‘the cultural diversity, the “quality of life” issues, 
the protest movements and the liberations of the 1960s’ (2). This paper adds 
to Brown’s critique of the common view of the 1950s as a period in Australian 
history that was conservative and static and supports his argument that it was 
rather a decade of transition. In order to demonstrate more fully the signi$cance 
of these !oods, then, I will draw attention to the wider context in which they 
occurred and begin with a short discussion of the regulation of the Murray and 
the ideas that underpinned the radical transformation of an entire river system.
In the 1950s, people living along the Murray were experiencing one of the 
most dramatic environmental interventions in twentieth-century Australia, the 
regulation of the Murray simultaneously for drought mitigation, navigation, 
irrigation and hydro-electricity. Dam-building was part of an almost worldwide 
post-war pursuit of progressionist development that provided employment 
for the unemployed and immigrants, new production bases, and symbols of 
nationalism. It was underwritten by a renewed faith in human ability and 
technology. Jacques Leslie, re!ecting on the impact of dams in 2005, noted that 
large dams can today be found in ‘60 percent of the world’s two hundred-plus 
major river basins’ and geophysicists speculate that the shift in weight from 
these storages has ‘slightly altered the speed of the earth’s rotation, the tilt of its 
axis, and the shape of its gravitational $eld’ (4). Constructions built in the post-
war period were major contributors to this planetary change; they also heralded 
more local and rapid spatial, social, and political transformations. 
The Murray was transformed into a ‘regulated river’ in just one generation, 
through state-, interstate-, and federally-built dams. The Lake Victoria Reservoir, 
Hume Dam, Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme, $ve barrages on Lake 
Alexandrina blocking the Murray mouth, thirteen locks spanning the Murray, 
Lake Mulwala and other works were completed between 1915 and 1974, and 
all were at least under construction by 1956.4 Most of these structures were the 
result of a concerted and shared e"ort to ‘canalise’ the river, a policy agreed 
upon by the members of the RMC after its establishment in 1917. The RMC 
included representatives of the three states that shared the Murray (New South 
Wales, Victoria, and South Australia) and the Commonwealth government. The 
canalisation of the Murray aimed to make it into a channel to support water 
supply from dams to irrigation settlements and, initially, to improve river 
navigation. The expansion of irrigation soon became the dominant rationale for 
the regulation of the Murray. In e"ect, this was an attempt to create a new, 
controllable river (Lloyd 181-84; Wright 281-83; Connell 56-61).
The dams were built by governments, the largest through joint interstate and 
federal organisations like the RMC and Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority (SMA).5 One of the primary interests of these organisations and 
the role of the dams was to ensure security to government-backed soldier and 
‘closer’ settlements on the Murray, which were mainly irrigation communities.6 
The dams would control river !ow, ensuring there was water in the river at the 
right times for citrus and vine cultivation and minimise the e"ects of drought.
These watershed management systems heralded a new kind of relationship 
between people and the rivers. The seasonal !ows of the Murray River were 
reversed for irrigation needs and eastward !owing rivers turned westward 
by the Snowy Mountains Scheme. The fearless ideologies of control and 
management that underlay river engineering were given expression in the 
construction of dams and irrigation planning and farming. Such ideologies were 
rooted in ideas of holistic, watershed manipulation. It was an era when large-
scale enterprises— ‘bigness’—commanded national and international respect, 
both in the size of dams and control over entire river systems. Big achievements 
promised ‘great rewards’ (Casey v). Irrigation settlements had been established 
along the Murray since the 1880s, but the Hume Dam and Snowy Mountains 
Scheme were built to feed irrigation networks on an unprecedented scale.
4 A ‘barrage’ is a structure built across a watercourse to regulate and manage water !ow. The barrages built 
near the mouth of the Murray were intended to control upstream water levels for irrigation, reduce salinity 
levels along the lower Murray, improve navigation at the Murray’s mouth and reserve pool water for Adelaide 
and southeastern South Australia (Murray-Darling Basin Commission, ‘The Barrages’).
5 The state governments involved in dam-building on the Murray and in interstate/federal organisations 
were the three that laid claim to part of that river: Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia.
6 ‘Closer settlement’ was the settlement of people on the land by the government at a high density, usually 
with the aim of increasing faming production through de$ned and limited farming plots within de$ned areas 
of settlement. Returned servicemen were some of those ‘settled’ on irrigation blocks (see Lloyd 184-185; 
Powell, Watering 146-47, 150, 167-70).
Since the 1930s the Hume Dam has been the primary regulatory structure for 
irrigation releases along the Murray. Initiated in 1919 and completed in 1936, the 
Hume was built as a joint venture between the Victorian and New South Wales 
governments, and was operated by the RMC. The Hume was widely revered as 
a technological achievement and as representative of a new human ability to 
control the river. Built in the inter-war period, the dam was intended to support 
existing irrigation farming and to create the opportunity for state governments 
to expand agricultural production on an unprecedented scale (Sinclair 69-71).7
The Hume was intended to alter the Murray’s !ows radically, and it did. 
Historian Paul Sinclair has noted that by 1939, only three years after the dam 
began operation, ‘the Murray’s !ow had been substantially modi$ed from its 
natural condition by the operation of the Hume Dam’ (69). The Murray changed 
from being ‘generally high, cool, turbid, and fast-!owing in spring and early 
summer’ to being ‘low, warm, slow !owing and clear by the end of summer’ 
(69). The dam held back water that covered an area of 33,000 acres and enabled 
dramatic increases in the area of land under irrigation in Victoria and New 
South Wales: from 814,000 acres in 1939 to 1,406,000 acres in 1946 (Sinclair 73). 
The Hume remains the ‘work horse’ of irrigation along the length of the Murray. 
Together with the massive casualties of the Second World War came exponential 
leaps in technology, progressionist ideologies of control and concerns for national 
security. It was within this context that the Snowy Mountains Scheme was 
initiated. The Scheme, which began construction in 1949 and was completed in 
1974, was envisaged as an engineering masterpiece of post-war reconstruction: 
an intricate system of dams to feed the Murray and Murrumbidgee irrigation 
industries and harness the regular seasonal snowmelt for hydro-electricity. 
Historian George Seddon has drawn attention to an important underlying 
motive for the massive engineering scheme: the belief that use of water resources 
on the dry continent needed to be maximised (Seddon 36-37; see also Powell, 
Watering 248-49). Post-war Australia aimed at national security, including food 
production, and the Snowy was an integral part of this plan as, together with 
the Hume and other structures, it would create a stable river for agricultural 
farming (Powell, Watering 207, 224-25). Whilst a product of post-war anxiety, 
it was also part of the 1950s self-conscious drive towards modernity, following 
the examples of America’s massive water diversion and hydro-electric projects, 
such as the Hoover Dam, dams along the Mississippi River, and the Tennessee 
Valley weirs (Tyrrell 173; Powell, Watering 204-05; Powell, Emergence 48-51; 
7 For more on the Hume Dam and the role of the RMC see Eaton 46-47.
Wigmore 122).8 It was conceived within, and regenerated, a national mood of 
faith in techno-culture. The Scheme became a powerful symbol of Australia’s 
development and modernisation within a global drive towards technical 
advancement rooted in national and progressionist projects.9
The project was the largest engineering scheme yet undertaken in Australia and 
was vested with national pride. Sir William Hudson, Commissioner of the SMA, 
articulated the importance of the scale of the project, which was ‘teaching us … 
to think in a big way … to be proud of big enterprises’ (quoted in Seddon 36).10 
Seddon likened the impact of the Scheme to the Gallipoli myth in the rhetoric of 
heroism that surrounded it. It was also similar in the public unity and support and 
sense of national pride it generated (Seddon xxiii, 36). Environmental historian 
John Merritt recently recalled that in the 1950s ‘[v]irtually every Australian 
knew something about the dams and tunnels in the mountains that would boost 
the country’s electricity supply and make the Riverina a vast food bowl—even, 
as the author can attest, school children in far o" Western Australia’ (59). The 
Scheme also attracted international attention for its ‘complexity and size’ (59). 
It was a symbol of post-war prosperity and is still referred to as ‘the greatest 
engineering scheme in Australian history’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘The 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme’).
In an era of ‘bigness’, the 1956 !oods conformed. In January 1956 the rivers and 
their tributaries were already high from heavy rainfall and !ooding throughout 
the Darling and Murray watersheds in 1955, so that relatively little rain in 1956 
could cause rivers to !ood (Bond and Weisner). The earth was so saturated that 
rain did not soak in, but ran directly into swelling waterways and ravines. By 
February 1956 the McIntyre and Condamine catchments in Queensland were 
so waterlogged that the Bureau of Meteorology recorded a 100 percent runo" 
rate, causing increased !ooding from relatively minor amounts of rain (25 to 
100 millimetres) (Bureau of Meteorology; Brundt). On the Murray, especially 
near the point where the Darling was contributing its !ood !ows, the ground 
8 Indeed, the Snowy Mountains Scheme’s Commissioner, Sir William Hudson, recruited experienced 
hydroelectric engineers from America (Merritt 59-60). Ian Tyrrell has documented early Australian and 
American (especially Californian) exchanges of irrigation techniques, water management bureaucracy, 
knowledges and engineers. For further discussion on the probability that Australian water management 
in!uenced management in America, see Powell, Emergence 48-50; Powell, ‘Australian Water’ 61; O’Gorman 
200.
9 For examples of dams and other technological projects in other countries that were connected with 
nationalism and state development in this period, see Leslie; Mitchell; Leybourne; Taylor; Worster; Reisner.
10 For further examples of the emphasis placed on the ‘bigness’ of the Snowy Mountains Scheme by its 
promoters see the Preface and Foreword to Lionel Wigmore’s commissioned history of the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme written by the Right Honourable Lord Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey and Sir William Hudson 
respectively.
was also saturated. In the irrigation district of Mildura, located on the Victorian 
side of the Murray River, the ground became so water-soaked in 1956 that the 
artesian aquifers rose to the surface. This made the ground so unstable that 
electricity pylons began to !oat. A resident later recalled that ‘the ground was 
so saturated … [that] in the switch yard you could push a 4 x 4 red gum straight 
into the ground over four foot just like that’ (quoted in Chandler 16).
The hopes that dams would provide environmental security and a more 
consistent river were shattered by the !oods. Water moved amorphously over 
the dams, submerging many irrigation areas. The Darling and Murray rivers and 
their tributaries all !ooded in that year. Each waterway experienced localised 
!oods and also, in most cases, a series of peaks. If the total area of the Murray and 
Darling systems is taken into account, !oods were occurring from January until 
November, with the major peaks in the Murray in August and in the Darling in 
September. The !oods were nebulous, spreading, peaking and pulsing through 
the watershed in irregular bursts and cumulative waves. Rainfall in April along 
both major rivers dramatically increased river heights, contributing to higher 
!oods in August and September (Harrison; O’Gorman 215-33).
The amount of rain, length of its duration, and area it covered compounded to 
cause one of the most signi$cant !ood events since colonisation in what is now 
the Murray-Darling Basin. A later RMC report estimated that the !oods in the 
Murray watershed alone covered approximately 1.75 million acres (as in the 
!oods of 1870 and 1917)—it was amongst the largest !oods along that river in 
terms of peak heights and submerged area (Harrison 12).
One year after the !oods, the RMC assessed the total damage in the Murray and 
Darling watersheds to be £5 million (Harrison 23). Damage to private property, 
in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia combined, was estimated to be 
£1.5 million, two thirds of which was in South Australia. The remaining portion 
of the estimate referred to damage to infrastructure and other government 
works and facilities. In 1997 Emergency Management Australia (EMA) produced 
a new cost estimate of the damages caused by the !oods (EMA, ‘1956 Floods’). It 
estimated the !oods between May and December 1956 to have cost £30 million 
($840 million, 1997 values) in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
combined, increasing the initial assessment by £25 million. A large proportion of 
this overall cost was attributed to subsequent losses in agricultural production 
(EMA, ‘1956 Floods’). For example, the Australian Dried Fruits Association 
estimated in 1957 that 63 percent of the raisin crop, 22 percent of the currant 
crop and 27 percent of the sultana crop had been destroyed (‘Severe Dried Fruit 
Losses’).
Even in its failure, the new frame of engineering that sca"olded the river became 
the frame through which the !oods were understood and re!ected upon. None 
of the dams were constructed to mitigate !oods, or included !ood mitigation in 
their designs. Although the Murray River had !ooded periodically, it was rather 
experiences of drought and the possibilities for irrigation (including increased 
population and production) that dominated popular and government desires 
for engineered works. Indeed, few dams in Australia then included any speci$c 
allowance for mitigating !oods. The potential to use dams for this purpose had 
long been recognised by engineers in Australia and around the world, but 
mitigating !oods through dams was costly and often any gain was thought to 
be outweighed by the expense of the structures. Flood mitigation more usually 
took other forms such as levee banks.11 After extensive and hugely damaging 
!oods in parts of New South Wales and Queensland in February 1955, mitigation 
of !oods though dams was initiated on a number coastal rivers in New South 
Wales. One of these rivers was the Hunter. On this river other means of !ood 
mitigation that had been developed since the 1870s were overcome by the 
unprecedented 1955 !oods. The !oods caused extensive damage in this region, 
which had become a highly pro$table farming area. Recuperation from the 1955 
!oods required signi$cant state aid. The building of a !ood mitigation dam now 
became justi$able in economic and humanitarian terms (Lloyd 288-89).
Following the 1956 !oods, investigations into what was termed the ‘!ood 
problem’ also began to receive greater attention along the Murray. Many people 
living along the river were concerned that !ood mitigation now be addressed 
more thoroughly, either through dams or other means, such as building more 
levees. Some residents were also worried that the dams themselves could cause 
!oods by redirecting water from one river into another. The Snowy Mountains 
Scheme, which had just come under construction, became an object of anxiety 
(Harrison 12).
One of the $rst indications of concern over the e"ect of dams on increasing 
!ood heights came from a letter written by the leader of the Country Party in 
the Victorian Legislative Assembly, Thomas Francis Percy Byrnes. Byrnes wrote 
to Prime Minister Robert Menzies in the wake of the massive 1956 !oods. He 
raised questions that had been put to his Party by people who lived along the 
upper Murray as well as ‘further along the River’. People were ‘disturbed at the 
possibilities of water being passed into the River from the Snowy Mountains 
Project at such times that !oods would be augmented and damage done to 
adjoining lands’ (Byrnes to Menzies, 9 November 1956, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 
1).12
11 Levees could, however, be problematic as they could raise !ood heights in other places (see Lloyd 289).
12 Thomas Francis Percy Byrnes most often used his middle name ‘Percy’ as his $rst name, thus the letter in 
this $le was attributed to ‘P.T. Byrnes’ (see Costar).
The list of questions Byrnes included, based on those of residents, were probing 
and technical, focusing on the e"ects of water releases into the Murray and 
Murrumbidgee rivers from the Scheme’s generating plant, once it came under 
operation. These questions expressed anxiety about changes to !ood and river 
!ow from the Scheme. Residents also sought reassurance as they scrutinised the 
SMA. They asked, for example, about the timing of dam releases, the amount 
of water that would be diverted from other rivers, whether gauges would 
be installed to monitor how river !ow was a"ected by dam releases, where 
these gauges would be located, and, perhaps most tellingly, could the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-Electric Commission (SMC), the working branch of the SMA, 
‘accurately assess the !ow of these rivers, and … calculate the e"ect which 
discharge of water from their generating plant will have upon the !ow of these 
rivers, especially at times when these rivers are at their peak !ow’? (Byrnes 
to Menzies, 9 November 1956, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 1). This last question is 
signi$cant as it sought to examine the river knowledge of the SMC. The !oods 
had not only cast doubt over the abilities of engineers to control the river but also 
over their knowledge of the river. Did the Commission know enough about the 
interrelationship of the rivers, dams, !oods and !oodplains? Further, in asking 
how the SMC intended to monitor changes in river and !ood !ow, for example 
through river gauges, residents were also questioning the Commission’s research 
and operational priorities. Not only were residents asking whether SMC and 
SMA decision-makers knew if !oods might be increased in some places, but did 
they care?
As the 1956 !oods occurred the river was undergoing major transformations. 
The previous year the $rst of sixteen dams that were eventually built for the 
Snowy Scheme was completed (Guthega Dam) and many others were under 
construction, including the massive Eucumbene Dam, the largest in the Snowy 
Scheme, which was $nished two years later. However, the concerns over 
regulation in 1956 focused on problems of the future—what would happen 
to the river on completion of the Snowy Scheme—rather than in any way 
connecting regulation directly to the !oods of that year. The !oods triggered 
concerns about the future e"ects of the Scheme and also about human ability 
to create a stable, controllable river. The !oods represented an uncontrolled 
danger, something that had not been foreseen, and also triggered wider doubts 
about what else had not been taken into account in the Scheme’s planning and 
construction.
The Prime Minister’s O#ce forwarded Byrnes’ letter to Spooner and the 
Department of National Development for a response. Similar concerns had 
recently been expressed by other residents and a summary of the SMA’s position 
had been compiled by its Commissioner, Sir William Hudson.13 Now, the 
Department addressed residents en masse through the press.
In the $nal month of 1956 Spooner issued a press statement assuring concerned 
residents in the Murray Valley that Snowy Scheme water releases would not 
aggravate ‘severe’ !oods (Press Statement, 26 December 1956, in ‘Flood Control’ 
pt. 2). Spooner’s press statement, which called on the expertise of Hudson, stated 
that the Commissioner had had ‘this matter thoroughly investigated’. Hudson 
and the SMA further defended the Scheme, arguing that once completed it 
would in fact ‘have a marked e"ect in reducing !ooding in the Murray and 
Murrumbidgee’ rivers via a system of reservoirs on the upper Tumut and upper 
Murrumbidgee rivers and water diversion tunnels. Spooner also drew attention 
to plans to enlarge the RMC-operated Hume Dam by a further 500,000 acre feet 
(half the cost being paid by the SMA), which, together with current enlargement 
works, would provide !ood mitigation as well as more irrigation water storage 
(Press Statement, 26 December 1956, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 2; Merritt 62).14
This press statement was picked up by a number of regional and metropolitan 
newspapers, including the Border Morning Mail (Albury), Advertiser (Adelaide), 
Mercury (Hobart), Ballarat Courier and Argus (Melbourne) (‘Flood Control’ pt. 
2). The headline of an editorial in the Border Morning Mail read: ‘Snowy Surplus 
No Danger to Murray River’. The article, printed on 31 December 1956, put the 
issue within the context of the !oods of that year:
With vivid memories of the all-time record !ooding of the Murray in the 
year ending today and the tremendous damage to valuable properties 
that followed and continued for several weeks, it was only natural for 
those in that famous old stream’s lower regions to ponder upon a greater 
menace when the waters of the Snowy were ultimately diverted to the 
Murray and its Murrumbidgee tributary. (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2)
Residents, claimed the article, while ‘as proud of the immense Snowy River 
project as they were when the giant Murray was harnessed in 1936’ (when 
operation of the Hume Dam commenced), had some reservations about 
engineering and its consequences for the river and !oods, and ultimately their 
lives and livelihoods. Spooner had put minds at rest, according to the Border 
Morning Mail: ‘Fortunately for all concerned their qualms no longer exist’ 
(‘Flood Control’ pt. 2).
13 Concerns had been expressed by September 1956 (see W.H. Spooner to Secretary [H.G. Raggatt], 17 
September 1956, ‘Flood Control’ pt. 1; ‘The E"ect of the Construction of the Snowy Scheme on Flooding in 
the Snowy, Murrumbidgee and Murray Rivers’ and ‘The E"ect of the Diversion of the Snowy River on the 
Flow of the Upper Murray River’, statements by William Hudson, 3 September 1956, ‘Flood Control’ pt. 1)
14 These works on the Hume Dam supplemented another enlargement of the dam that was already increasing 
it to two million acre feet. An acre foot is a unit of volume, i.e. acre = area, feet = depth.
Spooner’s and Hudson’s quick response to farmers’ concerns must be seen in 
the context of the national and international status of the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme. The reputation of the Scheme as a technological achievement and 
national bene$t was actively cultivated by its publicity branch and its leaders, 
including Hudson (Seddon 25-26). Merritt, in his study of the changing political 
and environmental contexts of grazing in the Snowy Mountains in this period, 
has drawn attention to the e"orts of Hudson to maintain popular support for 
the project, as it was only through sustained public enthusiasm that the Scheme 
could maintain its status, avoid controversy, and, indeed, continue. For example, 
Merritt noted that in order to avoid negative publicity over environmental 
degradation during construction of the Scheme, especially soil erosion, Hudson 
had included a soil conservation section in the SMA’s scienti$c division. 
Hudson foresaw the potential for signi$cant political fallout as irrigators could 
potentially join with recreational, scienti$c, and other lobby groups over the 
issue and ‘embarrass Hudson’. ‘But’, Merritt wrote, ‘no experienced hydro-
electricity engineer would willingly allow such a [public relations] disaster to 
happen’ (60). Perhaps this was also the case with Hudson’s and Spooner’s speedy 
reply to farmers that the Scheme would not increase !oods. 
Anxieties over the e"ects of the Snowy Mountains Scheme on !ood heights that 
had surfaced in 1956, which may not have been completely eased, resurfaced in 
1957. The Victorian Premier, Henry Bolte, raised the issue in a letter to Acting 
Prime Minister Arthur Fadden in May 1957 (Bolte to Acting Prime Minister, 28 
May 1957, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). Prompted by ‘[r]epeated representations … 
by landowners along the Upper Murray’, who feared increased !ooding as a 
result of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, the Premier put forward the concerns of 
a recent deputation and added some of his own. Those at the deputation, Bolte 
wrote, ‘even now’ experienced damaging inundations in the snowmelt months 
of late winter and spring which, he implied, were exacerbated by the year-
round increased !ows in the river, in turn due to Snowy Mountains Scheme 
diversions. The river, already carrying additional water because of the Scheme, 
!ooded to a greater height.
While ‘present !ooding had its problems’, Bolte wrote, ‘the prospect of 
additional water !ows’, as more dams began operation, ‘could be a matter 
of most serious concern, particularly to smaller land holders who envisaged 
the whole of their properties being rendered unproductive’ (Bolte to Acting 
Prime Minister, 28 May 1957, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). For Bolte, the SMA was 
clearly liable. However, in referring to the conditions of the Snowy Mountains 
Agreement of 1949, he was troubled that while the SMA was required to provide 
against soil erosion and siltation that occurred because of its regulation, it did 
not include any ‘speci$c reference to !ooding’. Bolte was further concerned 
that farmers and others in vulnerable areas along the Murray were not legally 
protected because the Snowy Mountains Agreement of 1949 authorised the 
diversion which caused the !ooding.15 In view of the legal situation, where 
the SMA was under no obligation to prevent !ooding caused by engineering, 
Bolte requested the Acting Prime Minister to extract an ‘assurance’ from the 
SMA that it would ‘do all that it can to avoid damage being caused … and that, 
where it is not possible for damage to be avoided, take action to compensate 
appropriately those persons who may su"er injury as a result of the Authority’s 
actions’ (Bolte to Acting Prime Minister, 28 May 1957, in ‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). 
Whether !oods were increased by regulation was a continual source of anxiety 
for residents along the Murray River, particularly with the completion of the 
largest regulator on the Murray system, the Snowy Mountains Scheme, on the 
horizon.
After further !oods along the Murray in 1958, residents became more outspoken 
on the subject, bypassing government representatives and going straight to the 
press. This time, though, farmers criticised the Hume Dam as well as the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme. In September and October 1958 the Border Morning Mail 
published a series of articles written by Harrison, by people in its readership 
sphere of the upper Murray, and by newspaper sta" (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). 
Following the newspaper’s report on a ‘!ood protest meeting’ held at Albury on 
26 August, prompted by the Murray again breaking its banks, Harrison wrote a 
letter, published in early September and quoted at the beginning of this paper, 
defending the RMC’s operation of the Hume Dam. Harrison denied that water 
releases exacerbated the !ood for those below the dam, declaring that, it was 
not ‘a “man-made” !ood … as no stored water was released’ (‘Flood Control’ 
pt. 2). Border Morning Mail reporters and those who had experienced the !oods 
saw things di"erently.
On the day following publication of extracts from Harrison’s letter, an editorial 
rehashed the opinions of ‘primary producers’ who had held the protest meeting. 
The report detailed their calls for an inquiry into the role of Hume Dam releases 
in causing or increasing the !ood, because of concerns that too much water 
was released by ‘mistake or miscalculation’. The editorial backed the protesters’ 
views, adding that when the Snowy Mountains Scheme was completed !oods 
could be further ‘aggravated’ (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2).
Accusations that the RMC’s operation of the Hume Dam increased !ood heights 
along the upper Murray kept coming. In early October an article written by 
Albury resident V. A. Krueger, printed in the Border Morning Mail, blamed the 
RMC’s policies as the primary source of increased !ood heights (‘Flood Control’ 
15 See Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act 1949-1973.
pt. 2). Krueger argued that the RMC’s policy was to $ll the dam to capacity 
well before the irrigation season in September, refusing to leave it empty to 
catch !oodwater—and thereby possibly reduce !ood heights—because of its 
commitment to irrigators. It was, Krueger described, a ‘no risk’ policy: the RMC 
would not risk having an empty dam at the start of the watering season. The 
Albury resident labelled the policy ‘weak and defeatist’ arguing that those who 
were not irrigators su"ered as a result: ‘$lling the weir at the earliest[,] no risk 
is taken with [water] conservation while every risk of !ood devastation now 
falls on the downstream landholders—a full weir will not hold its !ood waters’ 
(‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). By maintaining a full dam the RMC was responsible for 
the !ood by neglecting mitigation. 
The Snowy Mountains Scheme also made an appearance in Krueger’s account. 
The Scheme would be used to divert Snowy River water into the Hume Dam in 
dry years, to supply irrigation along the Murray. If a !ood was then to occur, 
Krueger speculated, the additional water in the Hume weir would cause the 
peak to be higher than it would have been if the dam had remained without the 
diverted water. Krueger claimed that: ‘Feeding these volumes of water into the 
[Hume] weir could, under this stringent conservation policy, later become the 
basis for intensi$ed !ooding’ (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). River regulation, which 
privileged irrigation, stirred emotional responses from this non-irrigator, who 
blamed the structures and the RMC for being impartial to his situation and that 
of fellow !oodplain dwellers to the point that engineers would (possibly) risk 
exacerbating !ooding for the sake of irrigation. Krueger stated that:
These water schemes have involved the nation in considerable 
expenditure, and in return the people are entitled to anticipate every 
possible bene$t. But under the prevailing River Murray Commission 
policy one section of people [irrigators] receives bene$ts while other 
people who could be bene$ted [others on !oodplains] are not even 
considered. (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2)
Governments were increasingly trying to manipulate an entire river system 
predominantly to sustain a single industry. Those who were thrown into the 
shadows of these polices were speaking out. The !oods in 1958 a"ected the 
dairying regions of Albury more severely than the irrigation districts on the 
Murray, and this also possibly contributed to the outcry by non-irrigators. Here 
we see the beginnings of some familiar debates in the second half of the century 
between graziers and irrigators and between advocates of wild and regulated 
rivers.
The state and Commonwealth governments’ bias towards irrigation created 
animosity from other non-irrigators, who expressed their sense of injustice 
at having to su"er !oods for the sake of irrigation and full dams. A. Reuss, 
president of the Albury-Wodonga Milk Producers Association, spoke out on 
behalf of dairy farmers in the Border Morning Mail (‘Flood Control’ pt. 2). He 
blamed the Hume Dam for more frequent and larger !oods that had limited milk 
production and ruined fodder crops. Reuss argued that !oods were increased 
because the dam was ‘kept full all the time’ so that heavy rainfalls more easily 
turned into !oods. Changes in !ood rates and heights had undermined his 
farm knowledge and planning. The newspaper reported changes Reuss had 
observed. Reuss ‘took over his property late in 1931 and up to 1946 there was 
only one !ood, in 1939, and he “never had to shift a beast”. The years from ‘41 
to ‘45 yielded below-average rainfall. But between ‘46 and this year, he had 
been forced to move his entire herd three times’. Reuss clearly felt that dams had 
radically altered !ood frequency and !ow across his farm. One of his concerns 
was the damage caused by the !oods, another was the uncertainty over the 
changing behaviour of !oods. He told the newspaper, ‘[w]e just don’t know 
what to expect and the authorities can’t tell us’.
Reuss had little faith in ‘the authorities’. He was quoted as saying: ‘They are 
completely destroying us and we don’t know how long we can stand it from a 
$nancial point of view … you can see what the weir has done’ (‘Flood Control’ 
pt. 2). The RMC was speci$cally targeted, as he claimed ‘the RMC is not helping 
us at all. The man below the weir is not being considered’. He told the newspaper 
that the situation was so critical that he and others were organising a deputation 
to Spooner.
Reuss’ belief that the Hume Dam could actually be used to mitigate !oods added 
to his sense of injustice. He argued that if the RMC ‘gave us a full river’ as 
soon as the dam reached capacity, the peak height of a !ood could be reduced 
as the water would be released steadily and the dam could hold back more 
of the incoming water. Like Krueger, Reuss was arguing that dams, built for 
irrigation, should be used to serve the interests of non-irrigators. This was a 
political argument. In this context, arguments for dams to be used for !ood 
mitigation drew attention to the narrow development focus of governments 
towards irrigation and challenged governments to broaden the use of dams to 
bene$t a variety of people. 
The newspaper article that discussed Reuss’ views was, like the others explored 
here, a clipping in the $les of the Minister for National Development. Next 
to this clipping the Minister’s Secretary and head of the department, Henry 
George Raggatt, wrote a note that outlined the di#cult position of the RMC in 
using the Hume Dam for !ood mitigation:
The RMC had a special meeting about this. They ‘can’t win’. If they keep 
the dam full & it rains they get this kind of complaint. If they don’t 
keep it full & it doesn’t rain then all the irrigation cockies [small-scale 
farmers] will say what B.F’s [sic] they are.16
The dam had been built for irrigation and seemed only able to be used for either 
industry water supply or !ood mitigation, polarising the interests of irrigators 
and non-irrigators. 
Brown has argued that the 1950s witnessed greater government centralisation, 
partly as a by-product of the previous decades’ mobilisation for war and need 
for increased national organisation (9). Projects of ‘national development’ 
provided a new focus for bureaucracies, such as the RMC, and the saw creation 
of new administrative units, like the SMA and the Department of National 
Development, that were the avenues for centralised government and aimed 
towards government projects.
That Reuss and Krueger blamed ‘the authorities’ is signi$cant. Greater 
government involvement in river !ow through these centralised organisations 
and dam construction and operation had made them responsible for the river 
in many people’s eyes. Dam construction had altered the river and changed 
what were previously seen as natural systems. As a result !oods were no longer 
natural disasters in the way they had been and were instead seen to come from 
a river controlled by o#cials. 
In the aftermath of the 1956 !oods on the Murray River, less blame was directed 
at the RMC, SMA and Hume Dam than two years later. The main source of 
anxiety for farmers was the future e"ects of diversions and consequent increased 
!ooding from the Snowy Mountains Scheme, rather than the in!uence of dams 
on the current !ood, even though the Hume Dam had already been operational 
for two decades. However, the 1956 !oods witnessed the beginnings of major 
concerns over the e"ects of dams on !oods, which brought together wider 
anxieties and a sense of injustice around dams. The debates that took place in 
the pages of the Border Morning Mail in 1958 show that those tensions between 
residents of the upper Murray and governments had not disappeared but had 
in fact grown, with people connecting existing regulatory structures to the 
!oods they were experiencing. Perhaps continued !ooding had made pressing 
concerns more urgent, and farmers, with stretched $nances, more demanding. 
Perhaps, too, the era of technological optimism was drawing to a close.
16 ‘B.F.’ was a common acronym for ‘Bloody Fool’.
Technically, the Hume Dam did not increase the 1956 or 1958 !oods. The RMC 
was, however, as Krueger and Reuss argued, implicated in its failure to mitigate 
the !oods, especially in 1958. The Hume Dam became benign in large !oods, 
such as 1956, and tended to slightly reduce the peaks of minor !oods, as in 
1958. Indeed, the Hume Dam was so successful in reducing !oods, later research 
showed that it had helped to prevent a number of !oods occurring both before 
and after its enlargement in the late 1950s, for example in 1937, 1941, 1959, 
1962, 1963, 1965 and 1968 (Sinclair 70). While this may be seen as a bene$t in 
terms of !ood mitigation, steadier river !ows and the accumulation of longer 
periods with fewer !oods has caused ramifying ecological disaster along the 
river and !oodplains (Sinclair 70; Weir 26-29).
The construction of the Hume Dam, designed as a remedy to droughts, had 
coincided with a series of wet years and this may explain the causation assigned 
to the dam by some farmers in 1958. Their sense of injustice towards the operation 
of this dam was felt rather than vindicated. Perhaps non-irrigators’ accusations 
were in!uenced by a broader sense of injustice, as many grazing licences in the 
Snowy River area had been suspended in 1958 to stem catchment erosion as the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme continued construction and lobby groups reacted to 
the environmental impact of the work (Merritt 90-92). The dams may have also 
become the focus of a sense of loss, symbols of changing government interests 
and a transforming landscape. That people were able to blame dams for !oods, 
however, marks a shift in understandings of !oods, rivers and dams. With dams 
and other forms of river regulation, governments became intertwined with river 
!ow: they were, in a very real sense, embedded in the river. The distinction 
between natural and unnatural river !ow became increasingly blurred.
The 1956 !oods set a new agenda for engineers. In the following decades 
the eastern states embarked on extensive programs of dam building: to feed 
irrigation networks, encourage new ones, supply enough water to growing 
populations and industries, and in some areas to mitigate !oods. The concerns 
of residents in Albury over changed !ood !ows were felt across the nation as 
the environmental changes caused by dams, irrigation industries’ privileged 
position, and the challenges of limited water resources all helped to turn dams 
from revered national icons to controversial constructions responsible for social 
injustice and environmental degradation.17
The 1956 and 1958 !oods prompted a decisive shift in popular thinking about 
responsibility for !oods; thereafter governments were assumed to be responsible 
17 See Powell, Watering 246-47, Figure 61 ‘Simpli$ed chronology and cumulative storage capacity, Victorian 
water supplies’ 252; Lloyd 281-89; Hallows and Thompson 41-57.
for the wayward behaviour of rivers. The !oods brought forth anxieties about 
environmental change and revealed a deep sense of injustice by non-irrigators 
towards governments’ pro-irrigation policies and radical changes to the river 
for this industry. The !oods were deeply entangled in the transformation of the 
Murray, both inducing and re!ecting changes. The 1950s have a reputation as 
years of ‘dullness’ and conservatism, and yet here we have a major environmental 
event that was a turning point and which had serious long-term political e"ects. 
The 1950s was indeed a decade of change that separated an old and a new 
Australia. It is out of these histories of dramatic as well as subtle change, much 
of the complexity of which remains hidden, that we will need to create liveable 
water futures. 
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